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Rare Earth Plant in Malaysia:  
Governance, Green Politics, and Geopolitics
Kai Lit Phua*
A rare earth elements (REE) extraction plant was built and began operating in 
Gebeng, Malaysia (near the city of Kuantan), from early December 2012.  This plant, 
slated to be the world’s largest when it operates at full capacity, is very controver-
sial in Malaysia.  Various factors appear to have influenced the setting up of this 
foreign-owned REE extraction plant, although the source of its raw material is 
thousands of kilometers away in the desert of Western Australia.  This article exam-
ines and discusses the reasons why the Malaysian authorities approved the highly 
controversial project despite the fear of the local community that it would have 
significant negative impacts on the environment and the health of the public, and 
despite major protests (some of which were nationwide) against the project.  The 
decision by the Malaysian authorities to approve it was probably due to factors such 
as the importance of rare earth metals in high-technology production; geopolitical 
considerations, with China dominating and supplying most of the market; high rare 
earth prices because of actions taken by the Chinese authorities; differences in 
environmental laws and their enforcement between Malaysia and Australia; and 
poor governance and lack of citizen input into public decision making in Malaysia. 
This article demonstrates how a seemingly local issue—specifically, strong objec-
tion by local residents to an industrial project—is linked to broader issues such as 
governance, regional and national politics, and the geopolitics of access to critically 
important mineral resources.  It also discusses various ethical issues in relation to 
the controversial project.
Keywords: rare earth, governance, environmental politics, environmental 
ethics, Malaysia
I Introduction
Foreign investment in the mining sector in developing countries can give rise to bitter 
conflict between local residents on the one hand and the investors and their supporters 
(including host government authorities) on the other.  These conflicts are often fueled 
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by fears of—or actual experience with—serious damage to the environment, negative 
effects on human health, and negative impacts on livelihoods and property values.  Some-
times such investment may even lead to divisions among the residents themselves if 
some think they will benefit materially from it.
Hazardous wastes have been defined as wastes that “have the potential to cause 
harm to human health and the environment if they are improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, or inadequately disposed of” (British Medical Association 1991).  Mining oper-
ations often generate wastes in large quantities, some of which can be classified as 
“hazardous wastes.”
In theory, environmental and public health standards and their effective enforcement 
can protect local communities against the negative effects of foreign investment in sec-
tors such as mining.  However, it has been noted that in many developing countries 
standards may look good on paper but enforcement is often problematic because of issues 
such as lack of resources, inadequate training, or corruption on the part of local pollution 
control officials (Newell 2008; Sahabat Alam Malaysia n.d.).  A related concern is the 
suspicion that poor enforcement or inadequacy of environmental regulation can be used 
by transnational corporations to locate the more hazardous or highly polluting of their 
activities in poorer developing countries (Newell 2008).
In their review of the literature on global environmental governance, Frank  Biermann 
and Philipp Pattberg (2008) argue that it increasingly involves the participation of actors 
that were previously active mainly at the subnational level.  Thus, governance today 
involves not only environmentalists, networks of experts, government regulatory bodies, 
and multinational corporations, but also other agencies such as intergovernmental organ-
izations and international courts.  Recent conflicts over the possible impact of specific 
industrial foreign investment projects on the environment and health in Malaysia have 
seen the involvement of non-Malaysian (Australian) environmentalists and European 
experts (Oko Institut 2013) as well as international organizations such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2011).
In a similar vein, Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal define environmental 
governance as “. . . the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations 
through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes. . . . It 
includes the actions of the state and, in addition, encompasses actors such as communi-
ties, businesses, and NGOs” (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, 298).
Recent conflicts over environmental governance in Malaysia have involved a wide 
range of actors.  For example, the conflict over the Australian-owned rare earth elements 
(REE) processing plant in Gebeng has drawn in environmentalists and local residents as 
well as public sector regulatory bodies, individual politicians, political parties, scientists 
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and academicians, the courts, and even ministries that normally do not deal with envi-
ronmental and health issues, e.g., the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
Why did the Malaysian authorities approve the highly controversial project despite 
the fear of the local community that it would have a significant negative impact on the 
environment and public health, and despite major protests (some of which were nation-
wide) against the project?
Adnan A.  Hezri’s (2011) view on environmental governance in Malaysia is that it 
can be greatly improved.  For example, he notes that there may be a lack of coordination 
amongst various government agencies dealing with environmental issues, and the poli-
cies of the federal government and individual state governments can sometimes contra-
dict each other.  More than that, I argue in this paper that the approval of the project by 
the Malaysian authorities (especially the Atomic Energy Licensing Board or AELB, 
located within the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation), the construction of 
the plant, its operation under the two-year temporary operating license (TOL), and the 
resulting controversy are due to various factors, including the importance of rare earth 
metals in high-technology production to many developed nations (including Japan); geo-
political considerations, with China supplying 97 percent of the market (Hurst 2010); 
high rare earth prices when the project was launched because of actions taken by the 
Chinese authorities; differences in environmental laws and their enforcement between 
countries; and poor governance and lack of citizen input in public decision making in 
developing countries such as Malaysia.
II The Controversial REE Extraction Project in Gebeng, Malaysia
Rare earth elements such as lanthanum, cerium, and neodymium are a group of strategi-
cally important metals that are used in the production of high-technology equipment 
(including those with military applications) and, ironically, also in green technology such 
as wind turbines.  REE production in Baotou, China, has been associated with significant 
environmental damage (Hurst 2010).  Partly because of rare earth metals’ strategic 
importance and the dominance of China as a source of them, local political conflict over 
potentially harmful and environmentally damaging mining and processing activities asso-
ciated with REEs could conceivably also get entangled in geopolitics.
A foreign-owned rare earth elements extraction plant began operating in Gebeng, 
a small town near the city of Kuantan, the state capital of Pahang state, Malaysia (see 
Fig. 1), in early December 2012.  This plant is owned by an Australia-based company, 
Lynas Corporation.  The plant is a subject of great controversy and has energized the 
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environmental movement in Malaysia.  Basically, the plant imports its ore from thousands 
of kilometers away, in Western Australia, processing it in Malaysia and then selling the 
resulting REE to overseas customers.  At the same time the plant owners enjoy a 12-year 
tax holiday.  Meanwhile, there are no concrete plans for long-term waste management 
except for vague assertions that the waste (which includes radioactive thorium and 
 uranium) can be processed into by-products that can be sold on the market.  Western 
Australia authorities have explicitly ruled out the possibility of taking back any of the 
waste generated (Sta Maria 2012).
Gebeng lies within the Kuantan metropolitan area (population 700,000) and hosts a 
major industrial estate with many different foreign-owned factories.  It is located near 
the port, but the city of Kuantan actually lies about 25 kilometers farther south (Pahang 
State Development Corporation 2012).  Major foreign companies that have built chemi-
cal and petrochemical plants at Gebeng include BP, Kaneka, and BASF.  Some of these 
are joint ventures with Petronas, the Malaysian national petroleum corporation.
The public authority tasked with attracting foreign investment to the Gebeng indus-
trial zone proclaims that its
excellent infrastructure such as a 9-kilometre common pipe-rack connects the petrochemical plants 
of Gebeng Industrial Estate to and from the tank farm facilities at Kuantan Port and its liquid 
chemical berths to facilitate safer and faster transportation of petrochemical products between the 
two areas. (ibid.)
Improperly regulated petrochemical plants can have a significant negative impact 
on surrounding areas.  Critics—the most prominent groups opposing the project being 
Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas (SMSL; Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas 2014) and Himpunan Hijau 
Fig. 1 Map of Malaysia (showing location of Kuantan)
Source: Adapted from Wikimedia Commons.
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(Green Gathering) (Himpunan Hijau 2014)—fear that an REE plant would further increase 
the risk to the environment partly because of the chemicals used in the process of rare 
earth extraction.  Another reason is that when production reaches full capacity of about 
22,000 tonnes of REE per annum at the Gebeng factory, this plant will be the world’s 
biggest rare earth plant and will therefore generate a huge amount of waste too.
Processing agents and chemicals that will be used in rare earth extraction at the 
plant (Lynas Corporation 2012) include ammonium bicarbonate, oxalic acid, sulfuric acid, 
hydrochloric acid, magnesium oxide, kerosene, and trichloroethylene.  All these chemi-
cals are known to be hazardous to human health.  As for the waste that will be produced, 
it will include radioactive materials such as thorium and uranium and the products of their 
radioactive decay, e.g., radium.  Some of the isotopes of thorium and uranium have very 
long half-lives (extending into millions and even billions of years) and therefore will be 
present in the immediate environment as a result of REE extraction unless they are 
removed and stored safely elsewhere.
Final REE products include lanthanum-cerium carbonate, lanthanum carbonate, 
samarium europium gadolinium, and heavy rare earths carbonate as well as neodymium 
and praseodymium (didymium) oxide (see Table 1).
The plant at Gebeng is controversial because of the following three reasons.  First, 
Table 1 The Process of Rare Earth Elements (REE) Extraction
Step 1 Cracking and Leaching
• Rare earth concentrate is mixed with sulfuric acid and cracked in a rotary kiln to convert it to 
rare earth sulfate.
• Water is added in the leaching stage, and impurities in the form of iron phospogypsum are 
removed.  The solution advances to the neutralization stage to produce a rare earth-rich solu-
tion as feed to solvent extraction.
Step 2 Solvent Extraction
• Upstream Solvent Extraction: To separate light rare earths (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, 
and neodymium—LCPN) and heavy rare earths (samarium, europium, and gadolinium—
SEG—and other heavier rare earths—HRE):
i) SEG/HRE extraction
ii) LCPN extraction
iii) HRE solution iron removal process
• Downstream Solvent Extraction:
i) Didyminium extraction (lanthanum cerium/praseodymium neodymium separation)
ii) Cerium extraction (lanthanum/cerium separation)
iii) Didyminium purification (didyminium/samarium separation); samarium is returned to the 
SEG product.
Step 3 Product Finishing
• In the final stage, rare earth elements are precipitated as carbonates, hydroxides, or oxalates. 
Some are calcined to the respective oxides.
Source: Lynas Corporation (2012).
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it processes rare earth-containing ore (lanthanide concentrate) that is imported all the 
way from its source at Mount Weld in Western Australia and Australian governmental 
authorities have stated explicitly that they will not accept any return of the waste that is 
produced (Sta Maria 2012).
Second, Lynas Corporation, the company that owns the plant (called Lynas Advanced 
Materials Plant, or LAMP) has no long-term waste management plan in place although 
the waste will include radioactive materials such as thorium and uranium and the products 
of their decay.  No permanent disposal facility (PDF) has been built to store the waste, 
and no plan for eventual decommissioning of the plant exists.  The building of such a 
facility and a plan was recommended by a panel of experts from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA 2011).
Meanwhile, the main Malaysian governmental body responsible for regulating the 
project, the AELB, has arranged a financial scheme with the company whereby 0.05 
percent of yearly revenues will be paid to the AELB.  In response to criticism about a 
financial conflict of interest, the director general of the AELB claimed that this money 
would be used only to verify the company’s waste management studies by independent 
researchers (Yow 2012).  Yet, no detailed environmental impact assessment or health 
impact assessment has been done for the plant in Malaysia (Teoh and Palani 2012).
Lastly, huge amounts of waste will be produced.  It should be pointed out that 
although environmental contamination by rare earth metals can have an impact on human 
health, the substances are not especially toxic (Hirano and Suzuki 1996).  It is actually 
the storage and disposal of the waste associated with REE extraction that is of primary 
concern and the source of controversy.
According to Lynas Corporation, current plans are to have liquid discharge of 500 
tonnes per hour into the nearby Balok River, which flows into the South China Sea.  The 
company also claimed, in response to fierce criticism of its lack of a long-term waste 
management plan, that the waste could be processed into commercial by-products that 
could be sold on the market (Lynas Corporation 2011).  These include synthetic gypsum 
for the manufacture of plasterboard and cement; magnesium-rich gypsum fertilizer for 
plantations, crops, and soil remediation; and carbon-enriched magnesium gypsum fertil-
izer to rejuvenate acidic soils.  The remaining material allegedly can either be “disposed 
safely in a secure municipal landfill” if it is classified as non-scheduled waste or “disposed 
at a licensed facility” if classified as scheduled waste by the Department of the Environ-
ment (ibid.).
The estimates made by Lee Bell (2012) based on the experience of REE plants in 
Baotou show a different picture.  Bell made the following estimates of the huge amount 
of waste that will be produced per year when the plant reaches full capacity.  As radio-
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active waste, 22,500 tonnes of radioactive waste residue (containing water) will be pro-
duced.  As non-radioactive waste, 191.25 tonnes of fluoride compounds, 292.5 tonnes of 
flue dust particulates, 1,687,500 cubic meters of acidic wastewater, and 216–270 million 
cubic meters of waste gas (containing nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, 
hydrogen fluoride, dust concentrate, and sulfuric acid) will be produced.
III Factors Affecting the Approval of the REE Extraction Plant
Why did the Malaysian authorities approve this highly controversial project despite the 
public fear that it would have a significant negative impact on the environment and the 
health of the public?
Rare earth metals are of major importance in high-technology production to many 
developed nations.  The term “rare earth” is a misnomer since such metals are actually 
abundant.  But the challenge for rare earth production is that the metals tend not to be 
found in concentrated deposits, unlike other metals.  Rare earth metals are used in the 
manufacture of high-tech products such as mobile phones, aircraft engines, and advanced 
weapons systems (e.g., missiles) and, ironically, also in green technologies such as cata-
lytic converters, hybrid cars, and wind turbines.  Recognition of their strategic as well as 
commercial importance has led to efforts by governments and companies to either stock-
pile REEs (Grasso 2012) or engage in long-term contracts with companies supplying 
REEs.  M. A. B. Siddique (2009) analyzed the importance of Western Australia as a source 
of raw materials for industrial production by Japanese companies.  The fact that the plant 
owners in Malaysia have signed contracts with Japanese companies to supply the latter 
with REEs is simply a continuation of this relationship.  Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 
is also a substantial shareholder in the company that owns the Malaysian REE extraction 
plant (Lynas Corporation 2012).
In terms of access to REEs, there are also geopolitical considerations since China 
supplies 97 percent of the world market for rare earth metals (Hurst 2010).  Valerie 
Grasso (2012) noted the following:
In 2010, a series of events and press reports highlighted what some referred to as the rare earth 
“crisis.”  Some policymakers were concerned that China had cut its rare earth exports and appeared 
to be restricting the world’s access to rare earths, with a nearly total U.S. dependence on China 
for rare earth elements, including oxides, phosphors, metals, alloys, and magnets.
Additionally, some policymakers had expressed growing concern that the United States had 
lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials, and its implications for U.S. 
national security.
K. L. Phua450
According to the New York Times, in September 2010
China imposed a two-month embargo on rare earth shipments to Japan during a territorial dispute, 
and for a short time even blocked some shipments to the United States and Europe.  Beijing’s 
behavior, which has also included lowering the export limit on its rare earths, has helped propel 
world prices of the material to record highs—and sent industrial countries scrambling for alterna-
tives. (Bradshaw 2011)
Such actions undertaken by the Chinese authorities (under the guise of closing illegal 
rare earth mines in China in order to deal with environmental problems), and the result-
ing effect on prices of rare earth metals, has raised the financial incentive for producers 
outside China to increase production of REEs for sale on the world market.
According to a British newspaper, some experts believe that another motive for 
Chinese export restriction of rare earth metals is to force foreign high-technology man-
ufacturers to bring their factories and technological secrets to China.  Thus, Dudley 
Kingsnorth, an independent rare earths marketing consultant, is quoted as saying, “The 
Chinese will not deny the rest of the world rare-earths but the price will be that the West 
needs to move its manufacturing facilities to China in order to get access” (Jones 2010).
Differences in environmental standards and enforcement vigor between countries 
such as Australia and Malaysia also appear to be a factor in the interesting phenomenon 
whereby REE-containing ore is mined in Western Australia but extraction of the metals 
is carried out thousands of kilometers away in Malaysia.  Lynas chose Malaysia to site its 
processing plant although the company also had the option to do so in Australia.  Table 2 
illustrates differences (as required by regulatory authorities) in REE production and the 
handling of waste in the two countries.
It is interesting to note that Australian standards forbid the accumulation of waste 
at the refinery site, while in Malaysia waste can be stored “temporarily” on-site.  In fact, 
Australian standards require waste to be shipped to the burial site immediately as it is 
produced.  Furthermore, Australia’s total containment policy mandates that liquid waste 
needs to undergo evaporation, thus leaving only solid waste for safe disposal.  In contrast, 
in Malaysia the rare earth extraction plant is allowed to discharge liquid waste at the rate 
of 500 tonnes per hour into the Balok River, which flows directly into the nearby South 
China Sea, as described previously.
The Gebeng plant is located on land that is prone to flooding.  This constitutes a 
significant environmental risk since floods can spread hazardous waste widely into 
 surrounding areas.  The Gebeng-Kuantan area is subjected to the heavy rains of the 
Northeast Monsoon at the end of every year.  The project site was flooded (to a depth of 
just a few centimeters) because of heavy rain as the plant was being built.  Kuantan city 
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also suffered a major flood, its worst ever, in December 2012 (The Star, December 24, 
2012).
There appears to be poor governance and lack of citizen input in public decision 
making when it comes to the Gebeng REE plant.  “Poor governance” can be defined as 
the failure of the authorities to adhere to the laws of the land or to follow relevant regu-
lations and administrative procedures.  Many local residents were unaware about plans 
to build the factory until the New York Times published an article about it in March 2011 
(Bradshaw 2011).  When citizen groups formed to voice their opposition to the project, 
the governmental authorities responded in ways that failed to alleviate public concerns.
For example, the government invited a team of experts from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations to evaluate the project.  However, 
many of the recommendations of the IAEA team were not implemented, e.g., the recom-
mendations that the project should come up with a long-term waste management plan, 
build a PDF to handle the waste that would be produced, and draw up a decommissioning 
plan for the factory (IAEA 2011).
Another example of poor governance and inadequacy of government action would 
be the approval of the TOL (valid for two years of production) in February 2012 and its 
issuance in December 2012, although a long-term waste management plan did not mate-
rialize and there were no plans to build a PDF for the waste.  Critics of the project tend 
to view this as a ploy to get the plant built and operating, supposedly on a “temporary” 
Table 2 Differences in REE Production and the Handling of Waste in Australia and Malaysia
Australia Malaysia
Waste is buried at Mt Weld, where it came from.  No 
accumulation of waste at the refinery; the waste is 
shipped to the burial site immediately as it is pro-
duced.
No permanent waste disposal plan.  Waste is tempo-
rarily dumped on-site.
Distance between Mt Weld and the refinery site at 
Meenaar is 880 km by road.
Raw materials are transported 1,000 km by land and 
more than 4,000 km by sea to Gebeng.
Nearest population center is 35 km away, with only 
1,500 inhabitants.
700,000 people live within 35 km.
Waste is diluted to 2.3 Bq/g. Waste is not diluted; radioactivity is nearly 3 times 
higher, at 6.1 Bq/g.
Impermeable ponds, progressively buried when full. Waste is temporarily covered by an “unspecified” 
method.
Located in the desert away from the aquifer; annual 
rainfall 234 mm.
Located on reclaimed swampland; underground 
water is just 0.95–3.5 m below the surface; annual 
rainfall 2,860 mm; area prone to flooding.
Total containment policy; all wastewater is evapo-
rated, and all leftover residue is returned at Mt Weld.
500 tonnes/hour of water is discharged to the South 
China Sea.
Source: Malaysian Insider (2012a).
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basis, although the important IAEA recommendations were neglected (S. M. Mohamad 
Idris 2012).
In January 2012, a major nongovernmental organization in Malaysia called the Con-
sumers Association of Penang voiced its strong opposition to the project and criticized 
the Malaysian authorities for poor governance and non-transparency with respect to the 
handling of the REE project.  The association urged that no TOL should be issued for the 
project.  It also claimed that various government agencies were acting in an uncoordinated 
manner (CAP 2012).
In response to criticisms such as these, ministers from four ministries (International 
Trade and Industry; Science, Technology and Innovation; Natural Resources and Envi-
ronment; Health) declared jointly that “[t]he Temporary Operating License (TOL) 
granted to Lynas requires as a specific condition that the company removes all the resi-
due generated by LAMP out of Malaysia.  This includes all products made from the 
residue” (Ministry of International Trade and Industry 2012).
Shortly after, one of the ministers made the seemingly contradictory statement that 
commercial by-products made from the waste could be sold in Malaysia itself (New Straits 
Times, December 12, 2012).  This was after the local managing director of the plant had 
publicly announced that international law forbade the export of hazardous waste out of 
Malaysia and that the company would process the waste into marketable commercial 
by-products called “synthetic aggregate” (Tasker 2012).
Pro-project Malaysian authorities include the prime minister and the chief minister 
of the state of Pahang.  Both Prime Minister Najib Razak and Chief Minister Adnan 
Yaakob have been defending the project throughout the controversy.  Najib said, “We 
have studied the Lynas project and we have come out with scientific evidence endorsed 
by local and international experts, that the Lynas plant and rare earth residue are safe” 
(Malaysian Insider 2012b).
The main Malaysian governmental bodies responsible for regulating the project, the 
Atomic Energy Licensing Board (part of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innova-
tion) and the Department of Environment (part of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment), appear to be consistent defenders of the project.  For example, during the 
worst-ever floods in Kuantan in December 2013, the AELB reassured the public that the 
“residue” (i.e., waste generated by REE production) storage areas and retention ponds 
had not been affected by the floods; that radioactive material would not leak into ground 
and underground water; and that even if there was flooding, there would be no risk of 
radioactive waste leaking to the surrounding area.  However, the AELB also made the 
contradictory statement that any radioactive material that leaked would be “diluted” by 
floodwaters to safe concentrations (Lim 2013).
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IV Anti-Lynas Movement
In the face of such inconsistent and even contradictory remarks from the Malaysian 
authorities, it is not surprising that the negative reaction of local residents and the larger 
Malaysian public has been strong.  One suspicion is that Malaysia will be used as a per-
manent dumping ground for improperly stored toxic waste (both radioactive as well as 
non-radioactive).
The Malaysian Medical Association (MMA) expressed its concerns about the project 
in a public statement released in July 2011.  In fact, the MMA declared bluntly that it 
believed that
there remain many unanswered and unresolved questions and concerns regarding the safety and 
the implementation of the Lynas rare earth refinery plant in Gebeng, . . . we remain deeply con-
cerned that public safety and health concerns have not been adequately met. . . . We need evidence 
that the plant will be totally failsafe and a guarantee that no harm will be caused to our people . . . 
the MMA joins numerous individuals, community groups and NGOs in urging the government to 
stop the Lynas project in order to ensure the protection of our citizens’ health and the safety of our 
environment. (Malaysian Medical Association 2011)
A scientific study commissioned by SMSL from the Oko Institut (Institute for 
Applied Ecology, a Germany-based scientific consultancy firm), which was released in 
January 2013, concluded bluntly that the proposed processing of waste from the rare 
earth plant into commercially viable by-products was “scientifically and technically non-
sense, and in respect to the so posed risks, careless” (Oko Institut 2013).  The study also 
declared that the operation of an REE extraction plant that generated huge amounts of 
waste like the Gebeng factory “should only be (temporarily or permanently) allowed if 
the PDF is available, otherwise another dangerous legacy is created and the burden of 
caring about and disposing these wastes is unacceptably shifted to future generations” 
(ibid.).  The study also pointed out severe technical deficiencies with respect to the 
planned method of “temporary storage” of waste on-site.
Thus, there are multiple areas of concern associated with the project, including the 
treatment of waste (e.g., no evaporation of wastewater such that only solid waste would 
remain), storage of waste (“temporary” storage on-site under technically deficient condi-
tions), and disposal (discharge into the nearby river and into the air, with other waste 
converted into allegedly safe commercial products that can be sold on the market in 
Malaysia).
All these issues have created worry among local residents and also given grounds 
for suspicion among the Malaysian public that there could be a financial conflict of inter-
est on the part of ruling regime politicians and the Malaysian authorities and their relevant 
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regulatory agencies vis-à-vis the REE extraction plant project.  The financial arrangement 
between Lynas and the AELB mentioned earlier casts doubt on the latter’s ability to 
regulate the former in a totally objective manner.  Another reason for suspicion is the 
mention in 2011 (which later disappeared) of an “indemnity fund” set up by the company 
in cooperation with Malaysian governmental authorities (Chong 2011a).  Details on how 
much was paid into this indemnity fund and who is managing it have not been forthcom-
ing from the parties involved.
Activist groups are continuing their opposition to the plant in various ways.  The 
main groups include SMSL, Himpunan Hijau, and the Stop Lynas Coalition.  SMSL has 
chosen a more legalistic route, with challenges filed using the judiciary system.  It has 
not given up on the strategy of using legal proceedings although the plant has been 
operating since December 2012.  Nevertheless, SMSL has also protested at the head-
quarters of the parent company in Sydney and attended the parent company’s share-
holders’ meeting to highlight the concerns of Kuantan residents about the entire project. 
The group has also sought support from green groups and sympathetic politicians in 
Australia.  One of the SMSL leaders said that there has been a “lost [sic] of faith and trust 
on the government brought about by their past responses to queries and appeals by the 
affected communities” with the phenomenon of “irregular approval procedures” for the 
REE project.1)
Himpunan Hijau has engaged in more dramatic direct action, including organizing 
demonstrations at the site of the plant and carrying out publicity-generating events such 
as the “Green Walk” protest march from Kuantan to Kuala Lumpur, which grew into a 
mass demonstration with an estimated 20,000 protesters at its final destination.  After 
this, it organized a protest motorcade that went in the other direction, i.e., from Kuala 
Lumpur to Kuantan.  One of the leaders of Himpunan Hijau, Wong Tack, even stood as 
a candidate for a Pahang parliamentary seat in the Malaysian general election of 2013 
(Anisah 2013).  Wong Tack was narrowly defeated by the candidate from the ruling 
 Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front).  The light green T-shirt with a logo produced by 
Himpunan Hijau has become an iconic symbol and features prominently at mass demon-
strations in Malaysia that push for clean elections and responsive, accountable govern-
ment.
Activists have been making use of traditional face-to-face meetings as well as infor-
mation and communications technology (including independent online mass media that 
are not linked to the Malaysian government) to mobilize opposition both in Malaysia and 
1) From personal communication between the author and Bun Teet Tan, Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas 
(SMSL).  Kuala Lumpur, June 23, 2014.
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overseas in Australia.  Opposition political parties in Malaysia such as Parti Keadilan 
Rakyat (People’s Justice Party), Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia), the 
Democratic Action Party, and Parti Sosialis Malaysia (Malaysian Socialist Party) have 
lent their support to the anti-Lynas movement.  The member of parliament for Kuantan 
—from Parti Keadilan Rakyat—has also lent her strong support for the movement oppos-
ing the rare earth extraction plant.
The REE plant has become a major political issue in the state of Pahang, where 
Gebeng is located.  Pahang is considered to be a BN stronghold, and the controversy has 
weakened support for BN in this state.  For example, in the May 2013 general election 
the federal parliamentary seat for Kuantan was won by the opposition.  Of the five Pahang 
state assembly seats under Kuantan, four were won by the opposition (The Star, May 9, 
2013).  The strong support given to the anti-Lynas movement by the opposition party 
member of parliament for Kuantan, the Right Honourable Fuziah Salleh, has boosted her 
popularity and shot her into national prominence.  Fuziah Salleh pointed out that the 
government of the neighboring state of Terengganu had actually turned down a proposal 
by Lynas to build the REE plant in the state in 2007 and demanded to know why Pahang 
had chosen to allow the building of the plant within its borders (Chong 2011b).  Parlia-
mentarian Fuziah Salleh and Pahang State Assembly Person Andansura Rabu have been 
especially active in opposing the project and in supporting anti-Lynas environmental 
activists.
The Gebeng rare earth plant controversy has not only weakened support for BN, 
especially in the Kuantan area, but has also energized the green movement in Malaysia. 
Thomas Rudel, J. Timmons Roberts, and JoAnn Carmin (2011) note that local residents 
may turn to foreign environmental activists for help in their environmental battles.
However, they note that the effectiveness of this strategy depends to a certain 
degree on
the preferences of the international NGOs for working in familiar democratic political settings. . . . 
The selective engagement of transnational actors means that domestic environmental actors in 
some of the nations with the greatest needs have difficulty enlisting help from external bodies and 
pressuring their governments to adopt policies that will reverse trends in resource depletion and 
environmental degradation. (Rudel et al. 2011)
The anti-Lynas activists have had some success in enlisting help from Australian envi-
ronmental groups and sympathetic politicians from the Australian Greens political party. 
Help has been forthcoming also from the overseas Malaysian community resident in 
Australia and from ex-Malaysians (now Australian citizens).  However, the mining lobby 
is strong in Western Australia, and this strategy does not seem to have made much 
headway.
K. L. Phua456
Robin Chapple, an Australian Greens member of the Legislative Council of Western 
Australia, declared in response to the approval of the TOL:
For all intents and purposes, this approval looks like the sanctioning of an Australian mining com-
pany making use of lax environmental controls and governance arrangements in a developing 
country.  To my mind it has not gone through a rigorous environmental process and should not 
have been issued.  This is a poor representation of Australian notions of “fair play” and good cor-
porate citizenship and one that it seems our State Government is paying little mind to. (Guthrie 
2012)
Major political parties in Australia, such as the Australian Labor Party, have been notably 
silent on the controversy.  Thus, Lynn McLaren of the Western Australian Greens, 
another member of the Legislative Council of Western Australia, declared, “It is unac-
ceptable for the Australian Government to wash its hands of responsibility for the effects 
of unsustainable mining, whether they are in our own backyard or that of our neighbours” 
(ibid.).
V Ethical Issues Fueling the Controversy
There are ethical issues associated with the siting and operation of the REE plant in 
Malaysia rather than in Western Australia, since the latter is the source of the rare-earth-
containing ore.  Local residents oppose the project partly because they were not informed 
about the project beforehand.  Iris Young’s principle of “participatory justice” (Young 
1983)—i.e., the right to take part in collective decisions that affect one’s interests—has 
been violated here.  On the other hand, some local supporters of the project—including 
politicians associated with the ruling BN government—argue that it is generating jobs 
that pay relatively high wages.  Thus, project supporters claim that activists opposing 
the plant are infringing on the rights of others to make a decent living.
Supporters of the project sometimes argue that the technological spin-offs may be 
considerable.  Ethical questions to be pondered here include the issue of overall costs 
(direct as well as indirect) versus overall benefits, the distribution of costs and benefits 
across social groups and across the two countries, benefits arising now versus benefits 
arising later, and so on.  The fact that the plant is wholly foreign-owned and that it has 
been granted a 12-year tax holiday has led activists to believe that local residents are 
getting the raw end of the deal, especially in terms of having to bear the health and envi-
ronmental costs arising from the toxic waste that will be generated (Lit 2014).
The principle of participatory justice is of major importance especially in light of 
Malaysia’s negative experience with the earlier and much smaller REE extraction plant 
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built at Bukit Merah on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia.  This plant, owned by a 
company called Asian Rare Earth (partly owned by Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation), 
extracted an REE called yttrium from monazite ore.  It operated from 1982 to 1994 in 
spite of protests from residents of Bukit Merah and nearby communities.  It was closed 
by court order in 1992, but the verdict was suspended and eventually overturned by the 
Supreme Court in 1993.  The plant finally closed a year later due to public pressure 
(including pressure in Japan).  Critics argue that there is a link between the waste pro-
duced by the plant and physical defects in newborn babies.  Furthermore, eight cases of 
leukemia occurred over five years among a population of only 11,000 people (Koh 2012).
An article on lessons to be learned from the Bukit Merah project declared,
It was a saga that ran for more than two decades, and it pitted the villagers, helped by various civic 
organisations, against big business and powerful state authorities.  An exercise to decommission 
the ARE [Asian Rare Earth] plant finally began in 2003, but the work to decontaminate the area is 
still going on and is estimated to cost RM300 million. (ibid.)
The Proximity Principle, i.e., the disposal of hazardous waste should be as near to 
its place of production as possible (Landon 2006), is also violated by the “temporary stor-
age” of waste on-site in Malaysia before it is “processed” into commercial by-products. 
Other harm that will arise includes economic and psychological harm.  Economic harm 
caused to people employed in the fisheries and tourism sectors, such as loss of livelihood, 
may not be compensated adequately.
The Gebeng project may also generate externalities for neighboring countries in the 
form of significant pollution of the South China Sea.  A vast amount of waste will be 
produced and discharged into it.  Possible health threats to residents of countries adjoin-
ing the South China Sea include airborne fine particulate waste, lead contamination (since 
process wastewater from cerium production will contain this material), and contamina-
tion—radioactive as well as non-radioactive—of seafood caught in the South China Sea. 
Other questions to be pondered include the possibility of significant damage to mangrove 
swamps, damage to coral formations, and eutrophication (algae blooms leading to oxygen 
depletion and death of marine life).
Psychological harm refers to any negative impact of the project on the mental health 
of nearby residents.  One could also argue that the project will have an unfair impact on 
future generations yet unborn as it will add to the environmental burden they will have 
to bear (Jamieson 2008).
If the health and welfare of residents are negatively affected, will residents be ade-
quately compensated?  And by whom will they be compensated?  These will be the next 
issues surrounding the REE plant in Gebeng.
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VI Conclusion
Various factors appear to have led to the approval of the controversial REE plant in 
Gebeng by the Malaysian authorities in spite of strong opposition at both the local and 
national levels.  I argue that the decision to build and operate the plant in Gebeng and the 
decision by the Malaysian authorities to approve it are probably due to factors such as 
the importance of rare earth metals in high-technology production and the resulting 
necessity of ensuring continued access to REE; geopolitical considerations, with China 
supplying 97 percent of the market and its seemingly politically motivated actions with 
respect to supply restrictions of REE on the international market (Hurst 2010); high rare 
earth prices because of such actions taken by the Chinese authorities; differences in 
environmental laws and their enforcement between Australia and Malaysia; and poor 
governance and lack of citizen input into public decision making in developing countries 
such as Malaysia.
Baotou has paid a heavy price in terms of environmental damage as a center for REE 
production in China (ibid.).  However, the Malaysian authorities approved the Lynas 
project and continue to support it even though Malaysia has had a prior negative experi-
ence with environmental pollution caused by the much smaller foreign-owned rare earth 
extraction plant (partly owned by Mitsubishi) in Bukit Merah, which closed down in 1994 
(Sahabat Alam Malaysia n.d.).
Top political leaders, such as the prime minister of Malaysia and the chief minister 
of the state of Pahang, continue to doggedly defend the project in the face of significant 
opposition from the Malaysian public, e.g., the “Green Walk” protest march from  Kuantan 
to Kuala Lumpur grew into a mass demonstration of an estimated 20,000 protesters at 
its final destination.
Opposition political parties did very well in the March 2008 general election in 
Malaysia, with the BN ruling coalition losing its two-thirds majority in parliament for the 
first time and a number of important states falling under the control of the opposition too. 
In the May 2013 general election, the opposition parties did even better: the BN was 
again prevented from winning a two-thirds majority in parliament.  Furthermore, the BN 
share of the popular vote was only 47 percent.  However, the BN remained in power at 
the federal level because the first-past-the-post electoral system allowed it to win more 
parliamentary seats than the opposition political parties did.
The green movement in Malaysia has been given a strong boost by the controversy 
through the support of opposition politicians as well as members of the public.  In turn, 
green activists have encouraged members of the public to vote for opposition political 
parties since the latter, in the shape of the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) coalition, 
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has stated that it will shut down the plant if it comes to power at the federal level (Free 
Malaysia Today, March 15, 2013).
In terms of economics, a 12-year tax holiday has been granted to the foreign inves-
tors.  Furthermore, only 350 jobs will be created directly.  Meanwhile, future damage to 
the existing labor-intensive local fisheries and tourism industries could be significant, 
notwithstanding claims by Lynas and its supporters that the REE project will generate 
spin-offs and even serve as a catalyst in attracting additional REE-related high-technology 
investments to the area.
The question arises as to whether there is enough democratic accountability in a 
country like Malaysia.  In other words, are the actions of the authorities sufficiently 
“transparent” to the ordinary citizens of Malaysia, and have they been carried out in 
conformity with usual practice in parliamentary democracies?  Who would ultimately be 
responsible for the consequences of the action of granting the operating license to the 
controversial Lynas project?  Furthermore, if the worst fears and predictions of the activ-
ists (based on the earlier experience with the Bukit Merah plant and the contemporary 
example of Baotou in China) come true, will those who suffer physical, economic, and 
psychological harm be adequately compensated?  Who will bear the costs of cleaning up 
the damage to the environment?  Meanwhile, the 700,000 people of the Kuantan metro-
politan area (in which Gebeng lies) who are caught in the middle of all this can only 
continue with their protests and strong resistance to the project with the help of their 
allies from the rest of Malaysia and overseas.2)
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